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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE Washington, BC 20610

> 185-*3605* w/#85-3567

October 23, 1985

The Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

SERVAND F. MAMANDIL STAFF BRECTOR IC & HEMBOR, MEIGRETY STAFF BRECTOR

Thanks for your letter of October 23, 1985, setting forth your plans relative to development of a National Intelligence Strategy. We want to assure you that nothing that we presently intend to accomplish through the Conference Report on the FY 1986 Intelligence Authorization is inconsistent with your In fact, what we are doing is supporting your plans by specifying in the Conference, to quote your letter: "general objectives and goals in the overall strategy and ... factors which will shape the development of any plan ...".

At today's Committee meeting, Senator Boren stated in simple terms the technical language which we are seeking for the Conference Report. We thought it would be worthwhile to share with you Senator Boren's perspective on what we are seeking with our language in the Conference Report:

- We need to understand the legitimate needs 0 of intelligence consumers and policymakers of the United States Government and the goals you establish for the Intelligence Community to meet these needs;
- We need to see your programs, with justification 0 identified by lead agency, to achieve the goals you have identified. We need to understand which programs you are requesting full authorization and funding, those which you are requesting partial authorization and funding, and those which, in the best of all worlds the Director feels need to meet his needs but neither current authorization or funding is requested. We would like to know why each program is included on each list.

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The Honorable William J. Casey October 23, 1985 Page Two

While the Conference Report language is a bit more technical and specific on how best to report this information to us, our guidelines for the National Intelligence Strategy are not micromanagement on the part of Congress. It gives you a free hand to get on with articulating an integrated strategy for U.S. intelligence.

Bill, we have recognized from the start that any effort to develop a National Intelligence Strategy required the commitment of Members of the two Oversight Committees and the Intelligence Community. This consensus has now been achieved. We apprepriate your support in helping to build this consensus, and look forward to seeing your first cut at a strategy in the near future.


Dave Durenberger Chairman


Patrick Leahy Vice Chairman Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13 : CIA-RDP89B00297R000501250006-8


United States Senate

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The Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505







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The Director of Central Intelligence

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23 October 1985

The Honorable Dave Durenberger Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dave.

There seems to be a misunderstanding as to how we should go about ____ developing a national foreign intelligence strategy and a plan to implement such a strategy.

I hear from up on the Hill that I have approved the draft Guidelines which have been circulated. That is not correct. I told Bernie McMahon, and reaffirmed to you in a briefing last week, that I thought it was counterproductive to spend time writing Guidelines in the abstract and that instead I would go ahead and have a strategy paper--based on our interaction on this thus far--developed by the managers of the Intelligence Community. This process is already underway, and I expect to have a first draft in November.

If we undertake to develop a plan pursuant to Guidelines developed in a vacuum rather than in the context of actually addressing the challenges and issues themselves in their detail, it is likely to be a long, drawn out and unproductive undertaking. Some elements in the draft Guidelines we have seen would require an amount of precision and effort far beyond their value.

I believe the course on which I told you I would, and have now embarked, is a more practical and useful method of achieving our joint purpose. Therefore, I hope that, at this stage, no language referring to specific Guidelines will be put into the Authorization Bill. I'm afraid that would restrict and divert both of us from what can best and most usefully be accomplished in this process and delay us in what we have already started to do.

The practical and cooperative way to address this would be for us to get our proposed plan to you, review it together and then see how we can meet any shortfalls you may find in what we do. If you feel that some reference to this effort needs to be included in the Authorization Bill. I would suggest it be confined to a statement along the following lines:

The Director of Central Intelligence, in cooperation with (or at the request of) the Committees, is developing a national intelligence strategy. As a result of this collaboration, the Director of Central Intelligence is preparing an implementing plan which will include both the Intelligence Community's assessment of long-range intelligence needs, capabilities and shortfalls, and its proposals for dealing with these shortfalls.

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This would be the operative provision. The Committees or the conferees—either before or after such a statement—can spell out general objectives and goals in the overall strategy and take note of factors which will shape the development of any plan such as the information explosion, the increasing difficulty and complexity of collection, the competition for resources, etc.

If we proceed quietly and expeditiously, as we have already begun, I believe we will get to the heart of the matter and get something valuable done in fairly short order.

Yours.

William J. Casev

cc: The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20510